Introduction
Oswald Falk is regarded by Robert Skidelsky as the man who understood John Maynard Keynes"s mind more than any of his contemporaries. He argues that it was Falk who gave Keynes"s "his superb understanding of the unruly financial mechanism of capitalism" which distinguished his work from that of his contemporaries (Skidelsky, 1992, 25) . The London stockbroker, Nicholas Davenport, recalled that Falk spent a lot of time with Keynes speculating in currency and commodity deals. According to the economist Tommy Balogh who worked for Falk it was his mentor who gave Keynes the insights to develop his theory of liquidity preference by understanding the gilt-edged securities market. Skidelsky (2000, 495) regrets that Falk, "the most perceptive contemporary Keynes-watcher" did not write a memoir of Keynes when perhaps he could have. This article inspects some aspects of Falk"s economic thought expressed and gathered through the prism of a correspondence with one of his closest friends, the Australian mining magnate, William Sydney (W.S.) Robinson and explores the correspondence between the two when they were both in their late seventies but not in their dotage. The paper focuses in particular on Falk"s recollections of Keynes and his views on why Keynesian economic policy in Britain would be tested under fixed exchange rates. As will become apparent Falk"s economic and political views, conveyed to Robinson, grew apart from Keynes. From his youth, Falk had been marked by a peculiar sense of pessimism about Britain and he became more stridently conservative and politically intemperate as he grew older which is likely to have led to the complete break with Keynes after 1942.
Falk and Robinson
Oswald Toynbee Falk and W.S. Robinson are both honoured by each having an entry in their respective country"s national dictionary of biography (Slinn, 2004) , (Richardson, 1988) . Both were business men and financiers who came into each other"s company in London in the 1930s. Falk was a respected figure in the City of London while Robinson was, after a stint as a financial editor with The Age newspaper in Melbourne, a key figure in Australian mining especially associated with the Collins House Group of companies. Robinson was one of the Australian Labor party"s grise eminence having undertaken wartime dealings on behalf of John Curtin, Ben Chifley and Bert Evatt. Before then Robinson had acted as a London intermediary for the Scullin Government in 1930. Using his London connections Robinson spent some time in London especially during the Second World War ensuring that Britain had access to ample supplies of minerals, namely, zinc and other metals for its war effort. Crossing into this another world, Robinson had some direct dealings and correspondence with Keynes. For six months Keynes had provided political and economic briefings for Robinson"s Melbourne-based Collins House Group of mining concerns before he gave up believing that the service he was rendering to the Australian company was not worth much.
1 In one celebrated incident, Robinson, with his business associate, Clive Baillieu along with the Australian press baron, Keith Murdoch hatched an extraordinary plan to bring him out to Australia for a lecture tour while writing exclusively for the latter"s newspapers -for the princely fee of £2500. Falk relayed the proposal to Keynes. 2 According to Lord Horne, Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Lloyd George Government, Robinson was regarded as "one of the really great men of the British Empire". 3 The British were indebted to Robinson for several reasons.
According to Brendan Bracken who was a close adviser to Britain"s wartime Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, Robinson, through his wide contacts in Germany and knowledge of the aircraft industry, channelled information to Churchill about the rise of Nazi air power during the 1930s.During the Second World War Robinson helped Britain access metals below world price levels with the only proviso being that he wanted neither publicity nor honours.
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There is however a fair sampling of his thought in the lively correspondence with Robinson. Falk (1918) submitted an article to the Economic Journal warning that Britain could not make a smooth transition to the Gold Standard once peace was proclaimed.
Falk was one of the first analysts to see that Britain could not return to the Gold Standard after the war. He drew Robinson"s attention to the fact, however, that Keynes wrote a memorandum for the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Austin Chamberlain, advocating a return after the armistice to the old dollar parity for sterling. 13 Falk added in his letter that he never "agreed with Keynes"s idea of fixed exchange rates and the adjustment of parities by big jumps when they became inevitable". He would maintain that position 30 years later, telling Robinson: "The only solution is to recognize the inescapable fact that exchange rates for many have to be adjusted to changing rates of equilibrium in economic affairs, …And I believe that the continuous adjustment Page 4 of 10 of floating exchange rates are better than large adjustment by jumps following crises in the foreign exchanges. Moreover, in my opinion, it is a fundamental mistake to attempt to achieve stable rates and money prices by adjusting economic needs to that stability. Money should be the servant not our master".
14 In his notes on Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England which he gave to Robinson, Falk noted that he was against moving to restoring the gold standard as early as 1916. Falk"s article for The Nineteenth Century was entitled "Will London be a free market for Gold after the war?" In that article Falk said that after the war "We may find that we are left with no alternative at all to the suspension of specie payments". In April 1922 Falk gave an address at the Royal Society of Arts on the problem of currency stabilization. He concluded his paper "The pre-war financial policy will not work under post-war conditions… and the Treasury and Bank of England are better fitted for the work of operating an old policy than for the very different task of devising a new one. Our problems should be submitted to a fresh committee on currency before we attempt a return to the gold standard. If this is not to be, then may Heaven deliver us from the Norman Conquest of 4.86". 15 Montagu Norman was made aware of Falk"s views but tended to regard talk of devaluation of as tantamount to default. When Norman decided that it was best if the standard was restored, Falk "who was always sharp in his personal relations" cut off all contact with him (Davenport, 1974, 45) . The Cunliffe Committee was commissioned to consider Britain"s approach to the Gold Standard and it recommended the undeclared but deliberate path of deflation as the means for Britain to re-assume the pre-war Gold Standard.
In Falk"s eyes Norman had committed the cardinal sin of trying to fix the currency value when the state of the domestic economy required its flexibility. It violated a principle that Falk had adopted since his undergraduate days, namely, the teachings of the Greek philosopher Heracleitus that "All is flux, nothing is stationary". Falk and Robinson agreed with that maxim. Falk had come across it in his student days and it had become his "guiding principle ever since". Falk told Robinson "The trouble with Montagu Norman and so many others in charge of our affairs…has been not stupidity …but unwillingness to accept the disturbance of their peace which the Heracleitus truth involves". 16 The conflict between trying to ensure internal and external stability under a fixed exchange rate regime would become a perennial issue of conversation between the two. Robinson once confessed to Copland that "I am one of those poor benighted beings who sees no merit whatsoever in controlled exchanges without controlled prices and if this cannot be achieved I would welcome complete freedom of exchanges". 17 Both Robinson and Falk believed therefore that the pursuit of some automatic control mechanism, liked fixed parities to govern the economy was a will o" the wisp.
Keynes and Falk attended the 1919 Paris peace conference as part of the Treasury delegation. While Keynes famously resigned in protest and went off to write his polemic against the harsh peace terms foisted on Germany, Falk, equally pessimistic about a lasting peace being achieved, was awarded an imperial honour. Falk told Davenport (1974, 45) that Keynes had written The Economic Consequences of the Peace in "the white heat of fury" because he had heard that Lloyd George was going to sack him. It was inevitable Keynes and Falk were drawn to each other. Tall and broad-shouldered, Falk had "a brilliant mind and an explosive personality" and was "quick, rude and decisive" (Davenport, 1974, 44) . Both men loved the art of conversation and eschewed the telephone because it was, to their minds, detrimental to it (Davenport, 1974 ). An art collector and bon vivant, Falk introduced Keynes to the world of ballet, booking the seats at the Coliseum which led to his friend first casting eyes upon Lydia Lopokova (Davenport, 1974, 46) . Earlier Falk had arranged for Keynes to join the Tuesday Club -a private gathering of influential economists and politicians who met at the Café Royal in London. He noticed how Keynes quickly dominated the proceedings at the Tuesday Club and liked to shock the gathered with new ideas (Skidelsky, 1992, 23) .
After leaving the Treasury, Falk joined a stockbroking firm called Buckmasters and Moore. He was mindful that the new economic order had changed radically from the Edwardian era. Having already crediting him as "a natural economist" (Harrod, 1951, 220) , Keynes joined with Falk to form a syndicate to speculate in currency movements. Keynes lost his fortune in 1920 with money borrowed from both his father and Falk. His father reproached him: "I do hope, Maynard, this will be a lesson and you will be more cautious in the Page 5 of 10 future" (Davenport, 1974, 49) . Maynard, however, could not resist and was a continual speculator for himself and, of course, for King"s College where he was Bursar. Davenport (1974, 50 ) perceived a two-way gain here: "Speculation improved his economics and economics improved his speculation". Harrod (1951, 300) said it was a case of economists putting their money where their gumption was about the gyrations in the trade cycle.
Impulsive and dogmatic in his financial dealings with clients, Falk "would not look after any private client unless he was given carte blanche to do what he liked. The poor victim either made a killing in the market or was wiped out completely" (Davenport, 1974, 44) . It was Falk who concocted a new strategy known as "active investment" which was not for the faint-hearted. Sinn (2004) recounts how he told "investors to give advisers the wildest possible discretion and not tie their hands by rules of investment which may have worked tolerably well in the comparative calm of the Victorian age but which are utterly useless in the typhoons of this generation". Trust, lost all its capital in the great crash. Keynes and Falk had to hand over the concern to a city firm of merchant bankers. It, along with perhaps Falk"s dismissive view of British industrial stock, led to "a flaming row" between the two (Davenport, 1974, 50) . While they remained friends they never went into business again.
When Keynes retired from the National Mutual Board in 1938 Falk was one of the mooted successors but was considered too headstrong and his long-held views against investing in British industry did not help. He did however remain the economic consultant to National Mutual even in his retirement giving the company 40 years of service. In 1932 Falk formed the finance house, O. T. Falk and Partners. The company became a pioneering investor in Frank Whittle"s invention of the jet engine. During the war Stafford Cripps, the Minister for Aircraft Production compulsorily acquired the shares for a song which left Falk fulminating against socialism (Davenport, 1974, 140) .
My Dear W. S. -My Dear O.T. F.
In the hundreds of letters that flowed between Falk and Robinson over twelve years, enough can be gleaned to fill out Falk"s economic philosophy, recollections of Keynes and where the Keynesian economic revolution, at least in policy terms, had gone astray. The correspondence also rambled over the state of the British, American and Australian economies, literature, international relations, political philosophy and, most of all, changing ideas. Falk explained the last aspect: "To some people the inevitability of ideas seems boring. It isn"t because the events which give rise to the ideas are a constant source of surprise -we have to improvise every day". 20 Moreover Falk was adamant that in promoting "progress there cannot be any substitute for ideas and the application of them by human action". 21 Robinson wrote a little more often than his English It had been very different in February 1936 when Falk wrote to Keynes congratulating him on the publication of The General Theory. Falk acutely and perceptively dissected how his old friend had come to visualize the work :"I wonder…whether analysis is your fundamental process, whether it doesn"t follow, with a somewhat grudging struggle at rational justification, rather than precede synthetic ideas, which are your true delight, and with which from time to time you startle and shock the majority. Didn"t Newton once say that his ideas reached him by some mysterious route which he could not explain? And isn"t there something in the view that a new idea…may…be the product of the…moral feeling of an age, floating around us, and ready for apprehension by the most sensitive minds by other than reasoning processes. And isn"t it the artist rather than the scientist who apprehends these ideas?" (Cited in Skidelsky, 1992, xxii) . Keynes warmly responded: "I have read your letter about my book; and I would like to say how much pleasure it has given me. The extent to which one sees one"s destination before one discovers the route is the most obscure problem of all in the psychology of original work. In a sense it is certainly the destination which one sees first. But then a good many of the destinations so seen turn out to be mirages. Only a small proportion of one"s initial intuitions survive the struggle of trying to find a route to them". 33 Falk had no doubts either about what Keynes"s political persuasion and wrote to Robinson: "Incidentally, in accessing Maynard"s contribution to economic theory I think it is essential to remember that he was a liberal, or that his plans were designed not merely for a liberal economy but a liberal economy which worked as he wanted it to work. In spite of his advanced thinking he was in some respects rather old fashioned".
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As well as his politics, Falk, in reminiscing about Keynes"s way of thinking, recalled how he and Keynes would dabble in considering the consequences of assuming to be true the exact opposite of the usually accepted truth. "Scepticism", he told Robinson, "is a fruitful source of new ideas". He also referred to Keynes"s "elasticity of mind" reflected, of course, in his changing his mind on great matters with great rapidity and without much notice. In another anecdote Falk recalled the time Irving Fisher after a discussion with Keynes took Falk aside and asked "Was Mr. Keynes a hundred per cent serious?" Falk reminded Robinson that to understand Keynes "It was necessary to understand the value he attached to fantasy". 35 In another reflection, brought about by Roy Harrod"s response to Clive Bell"s comments on his book, Falk told Robinson "Maynard was not an easy character to understand. I saw much of him but never really knew him. I suspect that Clive Bell whom I saw often experienced a very different side of Keynes from anything he shared to Harrod. I wonder whether anyone knew what Maynard was like when quite alone and with himself. Of course, most people are frightened of the possible results of meeting themselves". 36 Falk assured Robinson that he had strong Keynesian sympathies. He told Robinson, for instance, how, in 1904, he had used in a memorandum the idea that idle savings and unemployed men were "potential positives". 37 In another letter he wrote "Like Maynard, I have always feared that in spite of this rapid change the private economy would allow slack to develop in the total volume of activity at times unless social security are based on a fundamental mistake regarding the moral and psychological development of the mass of mankind". 47 Falk felt that commitment to full employment, either by priming aggregate demand or excessive credit creation would compromise economic management. It was not a matter of indifference how the slack in aggregate demand was taken up by more consumption or by more investment. He much preferred the latter. However, "under democracy" there would be simply monetary expansion to maintain full employment. Falk maintained "that Maynard was wrong and that his policy would end in disaster". 48 The breakdown would come not from the decline in investment but from a balance of payments crisis and pressure on the pound. There was another related aspect to maintaining full employment by beefing up expenditure. As he put it, "I don"t believe the Socialists, or Maynard for that matter, have ever realised fully that internal rigidity must result before long in external elasticity in the form of collapse, and in the long run in Falk took a remarkably relaxed approach to inflation; it was the price of progress. He told Robinson "It is difficult to believe that after all the centuries of recorded economic history those who think they control our affairs are blind to the fact that the instability of prices and fluctuations in them are inevitable"51 He was, therefore, not a dear money man. In 1957 he attacked Peter Thorneycroft, Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Macmillan government for his dear money which saw the Bank Rate increase from 5 per cent to 7 per cent to combat external pressures on the pound. Falk took to task a poor Treasury official at the Tuesday Club:
"In this new-fangled world, in which we have to struggle for survival against the advantages of great Continental economies, we shall be fatally handicapped if we listen to the Polonius-like maxims of a rentierminded Government. Borrowing does not dull the edge of husbandry. On the contrary, it is the instrument of progress. At present it appears likely that after a short business recession we shall experience again the high rate of activity associated with rapid technolical changes and other innovations. If a rising price level proves to be the inevitable and not unusual feature of this phase of history, we shall be wise to accept it as part of the cost. Better fifty years inflating than a cycle of decay" (Cited in Davenport, 1974, 193-4) .
In short, Falk was convinced that resort to the old prescription of boom and bust or "stop, go" policies would lead to the destruction of capitalism. 52 However, Falk did not support getting into a needlessly inflationary situation in the first case. It was the result, he told Robinson, of too much defence spending, housing and investment all at once. With full employment and a high rate of consumption the level of savings would prove inadequate. With this mix prevailing in postwar Britain he pondered "Which breaks first, the pound, full employment or the free economy? Will they all have to go?
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By 1963 the correspondence between the two gentlemen was coming to a natural end tinged with sadness. In one of his last letters to Robinson, Falk said that he hardly read the newspapers any more and was instead reading ancient history along with the Shakespearian tragedies.
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Conclusion
At first glance the correspondence between Falk and Robinson might appear as that of tired old men raging at how the world was passing them by. However examination of the letters reveals alert crisp minds well aware of the emerging postwar political economy and how the Keynesian consensus would ultimately fracture because of the rigidity of fixed exchange rates. It is also illuminating because Falk was a character from the business world that knew Keynes well and was, in fact, his first point of contact into the swirling world of the money and stock markets. Robinson, too, had dealings with Keynes and admired him. The two retired businessmen were united in advocacy of flexible exchange rates and economic progress and saw dear money and the obsession with economic security in the form of full employment could enfeeble the spirit of capitalism.
